From 0 → the first buyers.

When I joined, there was no real developer community, and the existing events had no clearly defined audience.

Customer and sales conversations clarified the ICP: data engineers, data leaders and CTOs at mid-market and enterprise companies operating petabyte-scale systems. They did not need generic developer content. They needed useful conversations with practitioners solving the same problems.

I chose depth over broad reach. The early programming focused on technical questions developers already cared about, with practitioners who could speak from experience.

Webinars, events and open-source content gave OLake repeated ways to enter the same conversations. Each one brought new developers in, gave existing participants a reason to return and created material others could share.

I designed the system end to end: timely data-engineering topics, hands-on speakers, controlled access and repeatable distribution.

LinkedIn drove reach. Luma and Meetup supported discovery and registration. YouTube extended each session. Slack became the owned layer where POCs, customers and open-source contributors could keep learning from one another.

The loop compounded: conversations shaped the programming, practitioners made it credible, and every event produced content and relationships that fed the next one.

Datazip had a broad enterprise proposition, but customer conversations kept pointing to a sharper problem.

Data teams described replication as expensive, operationally heavy and too dependent on incumbent vendors. They wanted more control, less infrastructure overhead and a way to evaluate a product technically before making a commercial commitment.

The opportunity was not to make the existing story louder. It was to narrow the product bet around a problem the market already recognised.

The founders and investors chose to concentrate the company around replication and move toward an open-source product.

My role was not to make that pivot. I brought customer and developer signals into the transition, then translated the new direction into a GTM system the market could understand and act on.

The repositioning gave the business what the broader proposition lacked: a clearer problem, a clearer buyer and a clearer reason to try the product.

Instead of asking the market to understand everything Datazip could do, OLake could lead with one urgent problem and let technical teams evaluate the product through open source.

OLake was attracting technical interest, but developers needed more than product messaging to evaluate it seriously.

They wanted to understand real use cases, hear from credible practitioners and ask detailed questions before trying the product in their own stack.

I built a practitioner-led community around technical education, direct product conversations and real replication problems.

Webinars, events and ongoing discussions gave developers a place to learn, engage with the product and decide whether it was worth evaluating.

Community was not separate from adoption. It helped technical users move from interest into hands-on evaluation.

I built and ran the market-facing system around adoption: shaping content for technical evaluation, creating paths from community participation into deeper product conversations, supporting POCs, and carrying recurring objections and demand signals back into product, positioning and enablement.

The operating principle was simple: make technical proof useful on its own, let practitioners engage at the depth they needed, and use real evaluation behaviour to improve the product and the GTM.

Money Club was an existing consumer P2P finance product built around recurring money pools. The problem was larger than awareness or distribution. For many Tier 2 and Tier 3 users, financial products felt distant from their lives and too often appeared designed to benefit from their vulnerability rather than work for them.

The trust gap was structural. The opportunity was to make the product relatable, credible and visibly built around the people using it.

Before

After

My contribution

I carried the research into every layer of the experience:

• Product development and the full UI/UX
• The app, web app and website
• Rebrand, positioning and messaging
• Social, campaigns and customer-facing collateral
• Referral and incentive structures
• NBFC partner and institutional communication
• Creative, media and PR agency management

Vrddi took the pooled-finance model behind Money Club inside companies as B2B SaaS. Where Money Club organised people through locality and community leaders, Vrddi organised participation around the employer.

Blue-collar workers lived with real financial instability and little support at work. Employers had the matching problem: retention. Neither side had a workable system. Workers had nowhere reliable to turn when they needed money, and employers had no structured way to support them beyond salary advances.

Vrddi built the missing infrastructure. Employers partnered with Vrddi, employees formed groups and contributed part of their salary into a recurring pool, and employers extended loans against pooled participation. Repayments replenished the pool, keeping it active year-round.

CONTRIBUTE → POOL → LOAN → REPAY → REPLENISH

EMPLOYEE = USER · financial security HR / EMPLOYER = BUYER · retention

The product only worked if HR bought it. The strategic move was translating an employee need into an employer-led benefit.

Financial security helped workers feel more stable at work, and that stability supported retention. In blue-collar workforces, where attrition is constant and expensive, Vrddi became a retention program with a financial engine underneath, not a loan product looking for a sponsor.

The positioning had to carry two stories at once. Employees needed a product that felt relatable and safe to join. HR needed a business case. The packaging and pitch connected both.

Evidence / results

The signal

During my first project at Mudrex, I noticed students returning to sessions and bringing friends. We saw them not as weak leads, but as a future market that could grow through trusted peers.

The choice

I proposed WAGMI: a campus-led community that built category trust before acquisition. Instead of pushing students straight into the product, we gave credible believers the structure and access to explain the technology on their own campuses.

WAGMI was my first project at Mudrex. I started it as an intern, scaled it into a growth motion, and was then promoted into the India business.

I started with ISB, then expanded through IITs, NITs, IIMs, BITS and MDI. I recruited and supported student ambassadors who ran campus chapters, organised talks, workshops and live projects, and built peer-to-peer interest in crypto. Discord programming connected the chapters and sustained participation between campus activities.

Mudrex gave ambassadors recognition and access. The company gained a network of future users and a concentrated hiring pool.

The signal

No single channel could do the whole job. Partnerships could borrow trust and reach. BTL programs could create direct consideration. Lifecycle surfaces could bring existing users back. Analytics showed where attention was turning into action and where it was dropping off.

The approach

The team treated these as connected parts of acquisition rather than isolated campaigns. Each activity needed a clear audience, conversion path and measurement loop.

I worked across user acquisition, influencer marketing and brand partnerships, contributing to programs with Economic Times, Zepto, CRED, Decrypt and KoinX.

I supported BTL activations across Bengaluru offices and co-working spaces, coordinated media, design, affiliate and influencer agencies, and worked on growth experiments from hypothesis through measurement.

On the lifecycle and analytics side, I tracked cohort behaviour, DAU/MAU and drop-offs, and worked on push notifications and in-app widgets to support re-engagement.